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INTRODUCTION

Keynes taught years ago that international cash flows are always political.'
Western response to the enormous increase in the number and the assets of
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), and other government-directed investment
vehicles that often get lumped together under the SWF label, proves Keynes
right. To their most severe critics, SWFs are a threat to the sovereignty of the
nations in whose corporations they invest. The heat of the metaphors matches
* Meyers Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, Stern Professor of Law and
Business, Columbia Law School, and Fellow, European Corporate Governance Institute.
** Fuyo Professor of Japanese Law, Albert E. Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law, and
Director of the Center for Japanese Legal Studies, Columbia Law School. The authors
appreciate helpful comments by Luca Enriques, Jeff Gordon, and Nicholas Howson on an
earlier draft of this Article. Responses of participants at a workshop of the Center on
Financial Law at Seoul National University, a conference sponsored by the Program on
Alternative Investments at the Columbia Business School, and a conference on Shareholder
Rights, Shareholder Voting, and Corporate Performance in Calgiri, Italy were useful in
shaping the proposal presented in this Article. Jenna Levine and Peter Conti-Brown provided
very helpful research assistance.
1. See John Maynard Keynes, NationalSelf-Sufficiency, 22 YALE REv. 755 (1933).
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the volume of the complaints. The nations whose corporations are targets of
investments are said to be threatened with becoming "sharecropper" states if
ownership of industry moves to foreign-government absentee holders. 2 More
tempered critics fear that SWFs will make decisions for political, not economic
reasons. 3 Calls for both domestic and international regulation of sovereign
wealth funds' investments are now a daily occurrence. 4 In this Article we frame
a minimalist response to concerns over SWFs.
The high profile controversy over the rise of SWFs is one-but only oneof the frictions that result from the interaction of two very different conceptions
of the role of government in a capitalist economy-"state capitalism as
opposed to market capitalism." 5 In the form of market capitalism that has
developed in the advanced economies, to be sure with fits and starts, the
individual company is the unit whose value is maximized. Prohibitions against
government subsidies and preferences reflected in WTO and European Union
rules are designed to prevent governments from shifting the level of profit
maximization from the company to the state. In contrast, some major
developing countries (China foremost among them) increasingly reflect a form
of state capitalism-what we call the new mercantilism. In this form, the
country is the unit whose value is to be maximized, with a corresponding
increase in the role of the national government as a direct participant in and
coordinator of the effort. For the developed economies, the belief that free trade
and competition amongst companies increases GDP at the national level is an
article of faith: the market polices the tautology. For developing economies,
particularly those whose enterprises must compete with companies from more
advanced economies, the state, acting through SWFs, through direct ownership
of operating companies, and through regulation, seeks to level the playing field.
For the new mercantile capitalism, the government attempts to ensure that
company-level behavior results in country-level maximization of economic,
social, and political benefits.
Although SWFs constitute only one mechanism of state involvement in the
economy, they have attracted great attention because for some commentators
they are the current face of this tension between competing forms of capitalism.
2. David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds Rule the World?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, at 16 (quoting Warren Buffett).
3. For example, Sen. Chuck Schumer recently stated with respect to SWFs, "So the
bottom line is that we don't know if their decisions are made exclusively on an economic
basis." James Politi, Sovereign Funds Face US Threat, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2008, at 8.
4. See, e.g., Bob Davis, U.S. Pushes Sovereign Funds to Open to Outside Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2008, at Al; Robert M. Kimmitt, Public Footprints in Private
Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the World Economy, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2008, at

119; Peter Thai Larsen, SWFs Warned to Adopt Code, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at 19;
James Surowiecki, Sovereign Wealth World, NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2007, at 70.
5. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman & Louise Story, Overseas Investors Buying U.S.
Holdings at Record Pace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2008, at Al (quoting Prof. Jeffrey E. Garten,

Yale School of Management).
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Lawrence Summers has pointed out that the cross-border activities of SWFs
and other sovereign investment vehicles have reversed the trend toward6
privatization that swept over the globe in the past quarter century.
Governments are now accumulating stakes in what were purely private entities.
As one commentator argues,
these trends [in the growth of SWFs and their investment activities] involve a
dramatic increase in the role of governments in the ownership and
management of national assets. This characteristic is unnerving and
disquieting. It calls into question our most basic assumptions about the
structure7 and functioning of our economies and the international financial
system.

Looking behind the rhetoric, SWFs' investments have attracted attention as
a result of two factors, one economic, the other tied to national regulation. On
the economic side are the large accumulations of government wealth SWFs
represent, together with changes in how this wealth is invested. The great

success of Asian exporting nations, especially China, and the rapid rise in oil
prices have dramatically increased the foreign currency reserves of nations with

trade- and commodity-based economies. China's foreign currency reserve of
$1.4 trillion is mentioned almost daily in the U.S. media. 8 Private analysts
estimate that with oil prices at the now-modest level of $70 per barrel, $2
9
billion of new petrodollars enter world financial markets every day.
Also, reserve-rich countries have begun to change their investment
strategy. Until recently, these surpluses were conservatively invested, heavily

in U.S. treasury securities and other national government bonds. Capital was
recycled without economic or political disruption.' 0 That pattern has changed,
but for economic reasons rather than because of changes in international
relations or foreign policy. Many governments have recently announced plans

to shift investment strategies for sovereign assets from conservative holdings of

6. Lawrence Summers, Op-Ed, Sovereign Funds Shake the Logic of Capitalism, FIN.
TIMEs, July 30, 2007, at 11.
7. Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign Government Investments in
the United States: Assessing the Economic and National Security Implications: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Sovereign Wealth Fund Hearing] (testimony of Edwin M. Truman, Senior
Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics).
8. See, e.g., James Fallows, The $1.4 Trillion Question, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb.
2008, at 36.
9. McKNSEY & Co., THE NEW POWER BROKERS: How OIL, ASIA, HEDGE FUNDS, AND
PRIVATE EQUITY ARE SHAPING GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS 45 (2007),

available at

http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/TheNewPowerBrokers/.
10. From time to time commentators noted that the U.S. had become reliant on these
investments to finance its trade deficit, and U.S. policymakers sometimes expressed concern
over the high level of U.S. government debt owed to the Chinese government. See CRAIG K.
ELWELL ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, IS CHINA A THREAT TO THE U.S.

ECONOMY? 43-44 & n.80 (2007), However, the stability of the pattern allayed all but
occasional concern.

1348

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1345

government bonds to higher-risk/higher-return investments in equities or
corporate acquisitions." Even the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, the
most conservative of the sovereign wealth funds, has increased its allocation to
equity by half-from 40% to 60% of its portfolio. 12 China has also signaled its
intent to increase its equity investments, both in its sovereign wealth funds and
in the portfolio of the government pension fund. 13 The announced reason for
these changes in portfolio strategy is straightforward. Like the Bush
administration's plan to shift social security investments into the capital
markets, reserve-rich countries say they are seeking the higher returns and
greater diversification associated with investing in a broader range of asset
classes.
The result has been a boom in high-profile, and highly controversial
investments. The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA) recently acquired
Citibank debt convertible into 4.9% of its common stock, which would make
ADIA one of the bank's largest shareholders. 14 A Chinese fund purchased just
under 10% of Blackstone's equity in 2007.15 Chinese and Singaporean entities
are discussing the purchase of a significant stake in Barclays.' Another Abu
Dhabi entity purchased 8.1% of the common stock of Advanced Micro
Devices, a U.S. chipmaker with Defense Department contracts. 17 Somewhat
less controversially but no less significantly, SWFs have recently made multibillion dollar investments in U.S. investment banks such as Citigroup, Morgan
Stanley and Merrill Lynch, whose capital was depleted by the meltdown in the
subprime mortgage market. 18 Collectively, sovereign wealth funds have

11. See, e.g., Stuart E. Eizenstat & Alan Larson, The Sovereign Wealth Explosion,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at A 19 (reporting that the governments of China, South Korea,

and Singapore announced plans to move up to $480 billion in foreign-exchange reserves to
riskier investments).
12. See Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Finance, White Paper on the
Government Pension Fund: Laying the Foundation for Good and Sustainable Returns (Apr.
13, 2007) available at http://www.regjeringent.no/en/dep/fin/Press-releases/2007/Laying-

the-foundation-for-good-and-susta.html?id=462876. ("The Government intends to increase
the equity portion of the Government Pension Fund-Global from the current 40 percent to
60 percent.").
13. See Bob Davis, China Investment-Fund Head Says Focus Is on 'Portfolios,' WALL

ST. J., Feb. 1, 2008, at A13.
14. Hot Topic: Will Overseas Funds Be a Juggernaut?,WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2007, at
AlI ("The deal gives the United Arab Emirates' Abu Dhabi Investment Authority a 4.9%

stake in the company, making it one of Citigroup's largest shareholders.").
15. See Keith Bradsher, World Business Briefing, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, at C12.

16. See Press Release, Barclays, Barclays Issues Shares To China Development Bank
and Temasek (Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://www.investorrelations.barclays.co.uk/

INV/A/Content/Files/140807_Announcement.pdf.
17. Abu Dhabi Buys Stake, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 17, 2007, at 13.
18. See David Enrich, Robin Sidel & Susanne Craig, How Wall Street Firms Reached
Out to Asia-Now Flush with Cash, Investors Find Deals on Trophy Properties, WALL ST. J.
ASIA, Jan. 17, 2008, at 19.
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invested approximately $60 billion in Western banks since May 2007.19
The regulatory reason for the controversy over SWFs is slightly more
nuanced. We must recognize that the tension between state- and marketversions of capitalism is playing itself out in two very different kinds of equity
investments. The first is acquisitions of controlling stakes in domestic
companies by operating companies owned by or affiliated with foreigngovernment entities. A prominent example is the failed 2005 bid for Unocal by
the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), an energy company
controlled by the Chinese government. To finance the bid, CNOOC was to
receive low- interest loans from a state-owned bank and its state-owned
majority shareholder. 20 Most countries already have regulatory regimes in
place to screen out potentially threatening investments of this type. In the
United States, for example, inbound foreign investment is governed by the
Exon-Florio statute, 21 most recently amended in 2007.22 Under the Exon-Florio
regime, the inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) reviews all notices of pending foreign acquisitions of control over
U.S. companies and can recommend to the president that specific transactions
be blocked because they pose a threat to national security. 23 The definition of
"control" in the CFIUS regulations is quite broad. It is not a bright line majority
ownership test; rather, CFIUS looks to the functional abilities of an acquirer to
exercise control.24 The regulations provide that there is no control when voting
securities are held "solely for purposes of investment," which is defined in
circular fashion to mean that the acquirer "has no 25
intention of determining or
directing the basic business decisions of the issuer."
CFIUS is explicitly charged with considering "whether the covered
transaction is a foreign government-controlled transaction." 26 Subject to a
narrow exception, foreign government-controlled transactions trigger an
automatic 45-day investigation and various congressional reporting
requirements, and require the president to make and publicly announce the final
19. Katharina Pistor, Global Network-Finance: Understanding East-West Linkages
Between Sovereign Wealth Funds and Private Banks 6-7 (Jan. 2008) (unpublished working
paper, on file with Stanford Law Review).
20. See Unocal Corp., Statement on Proposed Unocal/Chevron Merger (Form 425)
(Aug. 3, 2005).
21.

50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170 (2008).

22. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, PUB. L. No. 110-49, 121
Stat. 246. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act codifies and clarifies the
process by which foreign acquisitions of control are processed and approved.
23. The president's power to block a transaction is found in 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§ 2170(d)(1) (2008). Indeed, it was the threat of invocation of CFIUS review of the CNOOC
bid and concomitant political fallout that caused CNOOC to abandon its attempt to acquire
Unocal. See Edmund L. Andrews, Shouted Down, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, at Cl
(describing process by which political opposition led to bid withdrawal).
24. 31 C.F.R. pt. 800 app. B (2008).
25. 31 C.F.R. § 800.219 (2008).
26. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §2170(0(8) (2008).
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decision on whether to approve or block the deal.2 7 Other U.S. statutes prohibit
foreign ownership of controlling stakes in particular industries, such as airlines
or nuclear energy. 2 8 In other industries, such as commercial banking, the
acquisition of control-by a domestic or foreign entity-subjects the acquirer
to a comprehensive regulatory regime of reporting, activities restrictions, and
supervision that is unworkable for all but highly specialized firms. 29 Although
the national regulatory mechanics differ, virtually all major countries already
have regulatory protections in place to guard against threats to national interests
that take the form of acquisitions of control.30
The current controversy over SWFs, and our attention here, concerns a
second kind of equity investment: the acquisition of significant, but noncontrolling, stakes in domestic companies by portfolio investors affiliated with
foreign governments. In other words, our focus is the type of equity
investments that are not subject to the CFIUS review process. For example, all
of the SWF investments noted above are of this second type, and only a small
number of SWFs pursue investment strategies involving control acquisitions of
foreign companies. 3 1 At present, there is no specific national or multi-lateral
regulation of portfolio investments by foreign governmental entities. Yet even a
foreign entity's ostensible portfolio investments of minority stakes are said to
pose a variety of problems, including most provocatively a national security
concern raised by the fear of a foreign entity's potential to influence a
company's actions. In response, the United States, the European Union,
Germany, and the United Kingdom have all taken up the call for a regulatory
response. Proposals have ranged from widespread demands for increased
disclosure and transparency, to restrictions on the types of equity instruments in
which SWFs may invest, to calls for multiple-round, multi-lateral
negotiations. 32 In particular, Australia recently adopted a set of six principles
27. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(1)(B) (2008); § 2170(b)(1)(D) (mandatory 45-day
investigation unless Secretary of Treasury and head of lead agency jointly determine that the
transaction will not impair national security); 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(3)(B) (2008)
(congressional reporting); 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(d)(2) (2008) (presidential decision and
public announcement).
28. See 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 40102, 41102 (2008) (airlines); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2133(d) (2008)
(nuclear power).
29. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1841(a)(2)-(3) (2008) (defining "control" over a bank as owning or
controlling 25% or more of the voting securities or "directly or indirectly exercis[ing] a
controlling influence over the management or policies" of a bank).

30. See, e.g., CYNTHIA DAY WALLACE, THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND LEGAL
CONTROL: HOST STATE SOvEREIGNTY IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION (2002).
31. See Sovereign Wealth Fund Hearing, supra note 7 (stating that only eight of
twenty four countries' SWFs pursue corporate acquisitions, and among these only six
acquire foreign companies).
32. See e.g., Joshua Aizenman & Reuven Glick, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stumbling
Blocks or Stepping Stones to Financial Globalization?, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, Cal.), Dec. 14, 2007, available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2007/e12007-38.pdf (encouraging SWFs
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that would be applied by its Foreign Investment Review Board to SWF
investments, including whether the SWF's "operations are independent from
the relevant foreign government." 33 Similarly, the European Commission
recently recommended to the European Parliament and other European Union
(EU) agencies the shape of a common EU approach to SWFs, including
detailed governance and disclosure requirements. 34 The international lending
organizations have also taken up the
call, with the IMF, for example, calling for
35
a code of best practices for SWFs.
A thoughtful response to the sovereign wealth fund controversy requires
that we clearly recognize the tension between the two very different faces of
ostensibly non-controlling equity investments by foreign government entities.
Viewed from one side, these investments are simply a different means of
recycling trade surpluses through the capital market. This new source of equity
investments provides liquidity to the equity markets and lowers the cost of
equity for private corporations, just as foreign government investment in U.S.
debt instruments has reduced long-term U.S. interest rates (by an amount
recently estimated as 130 basis points). 36 Moreover, the growth of foreign
government investments in the equity market may be less of a strategic threat
than if the investments had remained entirely in U.S. government debt; equity
need not be refunded. The recent capital infusions provided to U.S.
financial
37
institutions also softened the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis.
The other face of foreign sovereign equity investments is the source of the
controversy. Viewed from this side, national security concerns anchor one end
of a continuum of issues concerning when the interests of a foreign government
may differ from those of an ordinary shareholder. To illustrate the point,
consider that critics of the Abu Dhabi SWF investment in AMD expressed
concern about industrial espionage, not just national security. 38 Similarly,
to invest solely in index instruments); Bob Davis, How Trade Talks Could Tame SovereignWealth Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at A2 (urging multilateral trade negotiations);
Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and

Accountability (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Policy Brief PB07-6, 2007),
available at www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf (arguing for greater transparency).
33. Henny Sender & Peter Smith, Australia to Step up Scrutiny of Wealth Funds, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2008, at 1.
34. Commission on the European Communities, Communicationfrom the Commission
to the EuropeanParliament,the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, A Common EuropeanApproach to Sovereign Wealth Funds,

COM (2008) 115 final (Feb. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Commission on the European
Communities, A Common Approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds].

35. John Burton & Chris Giles, IMF Urges Action on Sovereign Wealth, FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2008, at 4.
36. McK1NSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 84.
37. See Enrich, Sidel & Craig, supra note 18.
38. See Don Clark & Chip Cummins, AMD's Infusion from Emirate May Be Only
Respite, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 2007, at A3 (noting company statement that "no information
with national-security implications" would be involved); Richard Wray, Abu Dhabi Buys
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consider SWFs' rapid infusion of capital into U.S. commercial and investment
banks in the wake of the subprime writedowns. Few domestic financial
institutions provided capital. If the investment opportunity was attractive in
purely economic terms, why were the SWFs the principal investors? Perhaps
the investments were attractive to SWFs because they got something more than
a purely financial investment. Or perhaps SWF investments were particularly
attractive to the current managers of the investment banks struggling with
subprime writedowns because they could act quickly and were thought unlikely
either to agitate for change or to seek control, an unusual combination of
characteristics for investors in companies whose operating strategies created
the need for massive capital investments in the first place. 39 The European
Commission raises concerns that SWF investment policy "may reflect a desire
to obtain technology and expertise to benefit national strategic interests, rather
than being driven by normal commercial interests in expansion to new products
and markets. ' A Similarly, the principles adopted by the U.S., Abu Dhabi and
Singapore require that SWF investments "should be based solely on
commercial grounds rather than to advance 4 1directly or indirectly the
geopolitical goals of the controlling government."
Efforts to diffuse this tension between the benign and threatening faces of
SWF equity investments requires a strategy of regulatory minimalism, one that
does not spill over beyond addressing the potential conflict of interest between
the foreign government and ordinary shareholders to impair the critical capital
market benefits that flow from recycling large trade deficits. This is where
corporate governance enters the analysis: policing conflicts of interest among
participants in the firm has always been corporate governance's forte.
We propose a simple corporate governance fix that provides such a
minimalist strategy. Under this approach, the equity of a U.S. firm acquired by
a foreign government-controlled entity would lose its voting rights, but would
regain them when transferred to non-state ownership. The result is to separate
control from investment value; the expected returns to a foreign-sovereign
equity investor remain identical to those of other shareholders, yet the foreign
government entities lose direct influence over management through voting.
Sovereign investors with purely financial motives will still invest; the proposal
does not raise the cost of their investments. Sovereigns seeking strategic
benefits from equity investments, however, will find SWFs to be a less
Into U.S. Chip Firm, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 19, 2007, at 27 (describing political worries
about Arab nations investing in companies involved in sensitive areas).
39. See Homan W. Jenkins, Jr., Sovereign Wimp Funds, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2008, at
A24 (voicing the concern that "sovereign investors may provide support for maladaptive
corporatism" because they are recruited as friends of current management).
40. Commission on the European Communities, A Common Approach to Sovereign

Wealth Funds, supra note 34, at 4.
41. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Treasury Reaches Agreement on Principles for
Sovereign Wealth Fund Investment with Singapore and Abu Dhabi (Mar. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp881.htm.
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attractive vehicle by which to achieve their ends. This adjustment mitigates the
potential conflict of interest that animates the SWF debate without affecting the
benefits that SWFs bring to the capital market.
Some may perceive our proposal as protectionist. But to do so is to
misconstrue the impact of vote suspension. Vote suspension is protectionist
only in the sense that it operates on the frictions between competing versions of
capitalism; market-based capitalist regimes are protected against incursion by
new mercantilist regimes. But unlike a truly protectionist measure designed to
protect domestic companies' commercial interests rather than the integrity of
the structure of a form of capitalism, our proposal would not lower investment
values for foreign investors on account of their nationality or sovereign
affiliation per se. Moreover, as we discuss below, we fully anticipate that other
countries would respond by imposing reciprocal treatment on investment funds
controlled by U.S. government entities.
Our proposal is not a perfect solution to the tensions raised by SWFs. It is
under inclusive, in that influence can be exercised by means other than voting;
a significant shareholder need not always cast a vote to sway management. It is
also over inclusive, in that even regulatory minimalism will spill over to
unintended areas. We expect that countries whose SWFs are subject to the vote
suspension rule in the United States would respond in kind; thus, U.S. state
investment funds such as the Alaskan Permanent Revenue Fund (among the
42
largest SWFs in the world) may be treated reciprocally by other countries.
Despite its imperfections, vote suspension does serve to constrain a major
source of concern over SWF investment without creating a barrier to recycling
trade surpluses.
To be sure, vote suspension does not address the more deeply rooted and
significant frictions that arise from the interactions of different capitalist
systems, which do involve issues of real protectionism. However, it does
effectively address the high profile concern over SWFs that, left unaddressed or
addressed too broadly, has the potential to disrupt seriously the global capital
market through heavy-handed regulation and protectionism.
Part I describes the SWF phenomenon with a focus on the significant
changes that have propelled these institutions to the forefront of debate in the
global capital markets: their rapid growth and recent shift in investment
strategy. Part II explores the two faces of SWF equity investments-one
benign, the other threatening. The benign face is the prosaic desire of any
investor to achieve higher returns and greater diversification, particularly in
response to changes in the global markets and increasing liabilities resulting
from demographic trends. The threatening face is the possibility that SWFs
may invest for strategic rather than purely investment motives, raising the
42. Although it does not share some of the key characteristics of a sovereign wealth
fund, we expect that even CalPERS could be subject to reciprocal treatment abroad. For
further discussion, see infra Part IV.B.

1354

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1345

specter of national security threats, industrial espionage, and similar harms to
core interests of any sovereign state. Disentangling these two faces provides a
better perspective from which to craft a response to the SWF controversy. In
Part III, we present our minimalist solution-vote suspension for SWF equity
investments. We explain why this solution responds to the potentially
threatening side of SWF investments while leaving the benign face
undisturbed. Part IV examines the limitations of our solution, and explains why
these limitations are outweighed by the benefits of vote suspension. We then
conclude.
I. THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND PHENOMENON

Despite the recent explosion of attention and concern, the earliest
sovereign wealth funds are more than 50 years old and, until recently, have
operated in relative obscurity. But while these are not new institutions in global
finance, the economic landscape in which they operate has changed in two
dramatic ways. The first is the size of the phenomenon, as SWFs have grown
and proliferated in recent years. The second change involves a shift in their
investment strategy, from sovereign debt to corporate equity. In this Part, we
explore the SWF phenomenon and the recent transformations that have brought
them to the world's attention.
Like some other entities active in global finance such as hedge funds,
sovereign wealth funds defy attempts at straightforward definition. In essence,
they are equity investment vehicles established by and under the control of
sovereign states. The key characteristic is government ownership of the fund,
but this characteristic is shared by a host of other entities. Sovereign wealth
funds belong to a continuum of sovereign investment vehicles. 43 At one end of
the spectrum are central banks. At the other end are state-owned enterprises
such as Russia's Gazprom or China's National Offshore Oil Corp. In between
are sovereign stabilization funds, sovereign saving funds, and government
investment corporations. Thus, one way to define sovereign wealth funds is by

exclusion: SWFs are sovereign investment vehicles that are not central banks,
monetary authorities in charge of foreign reserves, or national pension funds,
44
unless they are financed by commodities exports.
Sovereign wealth funds are typically grouped according to the source of
their assets. Most sovereign wealth funds are financed by the sale of
commodities, especially oil. Prominent examples include the Norway
43. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.,

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FuNDs: A GROWING

GLOBAL FORCE 11 (2007).
44. GERARD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 3 (2007). National pension funds are included in the definition
of SWF only if they are financed directly by foreign-exchange assets generated by
commodity exports. This excludes, for example, Chile's Pension Guarantee Fund, but
includes Norway's Government Pension Fund-Global.
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Government Pension Fund and the various Middle Eastern SWFs. Noncommodity funds are typically established through transfers of assets from
foreign-exchange reserves generated by trade surpluses. The China Investment
Corporation is the most prominent example.
Just as it is difficult to provide a precise definition of SWFs, it is difficult
to generalize about their objectives and investment policies. The objectives of
the funds may include stabilization of the macroeconomic effects of sudden
increases in export earnings, the management of pension assets or a separate
tranche of foreign-exchange reserves, or the intergenerational transfer of
wealth. The assets may be managed directly by an agency of the government,
or management may be subcontracted out to professional managers within or
outside the country. Sovereign wealth funds invest broadly across asset classes
and differ in their investment strategies. Some are broadly diversified and only
hold small stakes in any one firm. Some take small stakes to avoid disclosure
requirements. A minority of SWFs acquire significant stakes in domestic and
foreign companies. Others, of less interest for our purposes, invest only in
sovereign bonds. The level of transparency also differs significantly. The
Norway Government Pension Fund provides full disclosure of its portfolio and
investment policies. 4 5 Most SWFs, on the other hand, provide virtually no
public disclosure. Transparency varies even within funds controlled by the
same sovereign. Singapore's Temasek publishes an annual report, while the
Singapore Government Investment Corporation provides no public
disclosure. 46 Chart 1 maps the investment approach and transparency of the top
twenty SWFs.

45. See Norges Bank, Norges Bank Investment Management, available at
http://www.norges-bank.no/Pages/Article
41394.aspx
(listing
fund
strategy,
a
benchmark portfolio, ethical guidelines and other fund information); see also Kristin
Halvorsen, Comment, Norway's Sovereign Fund Sets an Ethical Example, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
15, 2008, at 9 (by Norway's Minister of Finance).
46. See Burton & Giles, supra note 35 (calling the GIC one of the "most secretive" of
the SWFs).
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CHART 1: TRANSPARENCY AND INVESTMENT APPROACH OF THE TOP TWENTY
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8 (2007).

The numbers, size and prominence of SWFs in global capital markets have
expanded exponentially in the past few years. Today, the estimated assets under
management for the top twenty SWFs amount to over $2 trillion, and the total
value of assets managed by SWFs equals almost half the market capitalization
of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 47 Collectively, SWF-managed assets roughly
equal those in hedge funds and private equity funds combined. The current $2.2
trillion in SWFs compares with about $1-1.5 trillion in hedge fund assets and
about $0.7-1.1 trillion in private equity. 48 The five largest SWFs are ADIA
from the United Arab Emirates, Norway's Government Pension Fund,
Singapore's Government Investment Corporation (another Singapore fund,
Temasek, is in the top ten), the Kuwait Investment Authority, and the China
Investment Corporation. Each of these funds, as well as Temasek and Russia's
Stabilization Fund, has assets in excess of $100 billion. Table 1 lists the twenty
largest SWFs and their estimated assets.

47. LYONS, supra note 44, at 6 & 17 chart 3.

48. Id. at 6.
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TABLE 1: ESTIMATED SIZE OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
(IN BILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS)

Country
UAE

Fund

Launch

US$

Name

Year

billion (1)

% of 2006
GDP

ADIA

1976

625.0

520.7%

Governmental
Pension Fund-

1990

322.0

102.6%

1981
1953

215.0
213.0

169.0%
268.7%

2007

200.0

8.0%

2004

127.5

14.2%

1974
2005

108.0
60.0

84.9%
185.3%

1976

40.2

0.3%

1983

30.0

309.4%

2005

20.0

2.2%

1993

17.9

12.3%

2005

17.5

10.5%

1976

16.4

1.3%

2001

15.2

4.0%

2000
2006

14.9
9.7

15.6%
7.6%

(Abu Dhabi)

Norway

Global

Singapore
Kuwait

GIC
Kuwait
Investment
Authority

China
Russia

China
Investment
Corporation
Stabilization
Fund

Singapore
Qatar

Temasek
Qatar
Investment
Authority

US (Alaska)
Brunei

Permanent
Reserve Fund
Brunei
Investment
Authority

Korea

KIC (Korea
Investment
Corporation)

Malaysia
Venezuela

Khazanah
Nasional BHD
National
Development
Fund (Fonden)

Canada
(Alberta)

Alberta
Heritage
Savings

Taiwan

National
Stabilization

Kazakhstan
Chile

National Fund
Economic and

Trust Fund

Fund
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Social
Stabilization

Fund
Istithmar
DIC
State General

UAE (Dubai)
UAE (Dubai)
Oman

2003
2004
1980

8.0
6.0
6.0

6.7%
4/0%
16.0%

RF
Total

I

1

2,072

Source: GERARD LYONS, STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, STATE CAPITALISM: THE RISE OF

SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 15 (2007).

The sudden emergence and growth of SWFs as players in the global capital
markets are due to several interrelated factors. One is the spike in world oil
prices, which has brought massive revenues to oil exporters such as Norway,
Russia, and the Middle East. A second factor is the enormous accumulation of
foreign-exchange reserves by Asian central banks, a portion of which has been
split off and invested separately in SWFs. Official foreign-exchange reserves
49
for the seven major Asian central banks at the end of 2006 were $3.1 trillion.
These accumulations stem in significant measure from the current-account
deficit run by the United States, and have been fuelled in certain cases by
exchange rate management. Some Asian central banks-most controversially
the People's Bank of China-have intervened in the foreign-exchange markets
to preserve the competitiveness of their country's exports, buying dollars and
other foreign currencies while selling domestic currencies. This practice has
been dubbed the "Bretton Woods II" system because
some economies have
50
dollar.
the
to
currencies
their
pegged
effectively
Analysts predict that SWFs will continue to grow significantly in the
coming years, due to continuation of the same factors that sparked their growth
over the past decade. These include unrestricted international flows of capital,
predicted trends in commodities prices and foreign-exchange reserves,
continued high growth in transition economies, demands on the public pension
systems of aging societies, and high internal rates of return on the funds
themselves. One analyst calculates that if recent growth rates are repeated over
51
the next decade, total funds under SWF management will reach $13.4 trillion.
The IMF estimates that the aggregate foreign assets under sovereign
management could grow to about $12 trillion by 2012.52 Of course, whether
these figures are large or small obviously depends on the metric by which they
are measured.5 3 Currently, the largest SWFs, those from the United Arab

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

McKINSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 73.
Id., at 77.
LYONS, supra note 44, at 5.
Id. at 6.
See Kimmitt, supra note 4.
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Emirates, Kuwait, Norway, and China, have reached the same scale as the
largest global asset managers, hedge funds, and private equity funds in the
world. 54 By any measure, as a senior U.S. Treasury official recently noted,
"SWFs are already large enough to be systemically significant[, and] they are
55
...
likely to grow larger over time.
At the same time as their assets have grown, SWFs have shifted their
investment strategy toward equity in order to diversify away from relatively
low-return, U.S. dollar-denominated assets-particularly U.S. government
treasury securities. Until recently, such assets have been the mainstay of Asian
central bank reserve investments. As of November 2006, for example, China
held about $347 billion in U.S. treasuries and as of September 2006 the Asian
central banks collectively held a third of total U.S. government debt
outstanding. 5 6 The decline of the dollar vis-A-vis the euro and other major
currencies has reduced the attractiveness of dollar-denominated financial
instruments to foreign holders. Moreover, the quest for higher returns, common
to all investors, is made more acute by demographic trends in many reserverich countries. Aging societies in East Asia, for example, will place huge
financial burdens on their national public pension systems because in the
coming decades fewer workers will be supporting more retirees. To help bridge
the shortfall, planners must seek higher returns on publicly held retirement
assets.
A final factor influencing the recent formation and investment strategies of
SWFs is that success breeds imitation. Some government investment funds,
particularly Singapore's Temasek Holdings, have proven to be capable activist
investors. Temasek, founded in 1974, is a holding company for Singaporean
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government-linked corporations. It has
served as a role model for newly established funds in East Asia, and has been
57
suggested as a useful template for corporate governance of Chinese SOEs.
Norway's Government Pension Fund, one of the oldest and most professionally
managed of the SWFs, is also held up as an example of sound public
stewardship of investment assets. 58 Again, this phenomenon is not unique to
the world of SWFs. Just as the California Public Employee Retirement System
(CaIPERS) became a role model for activist public pension funds in the United
States, governments around the world are seeking to emulate the
success of the
59
Singaporean and Norwegian funds in managing public money.

54. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS, INC., supra note 43, at 13.
55. Kimmitt, supra note 4.
56. McKINSEY & CO., supra note 9, at 71.

57. Lay-Hong Tan & Jiangyu Wang, Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance
System for China's Listed State-Owned Enterprises:Issues and Challenges in a Transitional

Economy, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 143, 172 (2007).
58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
59. See Emma Charlton, Norway's Sovereign Fund Serving as Model, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 19, 2007, at C7; Raphael Minder, ADB Callsfor Transparency of Asia Funds, FIN.
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II. Two FACES OF SWF EQUITY INVESTMENTS

On first impression, it may be hard to understand why non-controlling
equity investments by SWFs are controversial. The benefits are
straightforward. Equity investments serve to recycle trade surpluses and to
increase the supply of funds to the equity market, reducing the cost of capital,
just as foreign government investment of foreign reserves in U.S. government
debt instruments has reduced interest rates in the United States. Equity
investment, as compared to investment in debt, is also more stable, in that its
withdrawal is less disruptive than withdrawal from the debt market. 60 Indeed,
because equity investments reflect long-term values, these investments leave
SWFs hostage to the health of the economies in whose corporations they invest.
Unlike government debt, the SWFs cannot hold equity investments until they
mature and decline to reinvest. Rather, equity investments must be sold to a
willing buyer in light of any change in circumstances, including the actions of
the particular sovereign; SWFs, and their governments, bear the cost of any
decline in equity value. Thus, increased equity investments by new
mercantilist-regime SWFs are arguably a better means of recycling funds
between state and market capitalism than sovereign debt investments. Finally,
SWFs supply a source of liquidity in circumstances where it may be greatly
needed. SWF investments in U.S. commercial and investment banks following
the depletion of their capital as a result of the subprime debt crisis-for
example, in Citigroup, Bear Steams, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanleyprovided needed capital that otherwise may not have been readily available.
So where do the problems lie? Judging from the terms of the public
controversy provoked by SWFs, the principal though hardly sole danger comes
from lack of transparency. Some of the SWFs making the highest profile equity
investments, such as those of Abu Dhabi, Qatar, and China, provide very little
public information about their investment strategies and holdings, in contrast to
the Norwegian fund, which provides annual reports disclosing both. 6 1 SEC
Chairman Cox has recently suggested that the lack of transparency of SWFs
may mask market abuses such as insider trading, 62 which if widespread could
raise the cost of capital by undermining investor confidence in the market. But
TIMEs, Nov. 26, 2007 (quoting Asian Development Bank as acknowledging that Singapore
"set[] the pace in Asia" and touting Norway as the best model to emulate); cf Sovereign
Wealth: A Code of Conduct Is Needed For Both Funds and Recipients, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 28,

2008, at 8 (noting that International Monetary Fund has asked these governments for help in
drawing up disclosure guidelines).
60. See Congressional Research Service, supra note 10, at 45 ("[T]here is a legitimate
concern that financial markets would be disrupted" if the Chinese dump their holdings of
U.S. Treasuries on the market.).
61. LYONS, supra note 44, at 20-21, 24, 27; see also supra note 45 and accompanying
text.
62. See Kara Scannell, Cox Cites Concerns over Sovereign Funds, WALL ST. J., Oct.
25, 2007, at A8.
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regardless of how many times it is invoked, the lack of transparency cannot
itself be the problem, and as a result greater transparency cannot itself be the
solution.
The fact is that all shareholdings are nontransparent unless a particular
jurisdiction imposes a disclosure obligation. For example, U.S. securities
regulation requires prompt disclosure of the identity of five-percent
shareholders in public companies and of those who seek to influence control
through a proxy fight or tender offer, as well as periodic disclosure of mutual
fund holdings. 63 Additionally, an equity sale by a public company of a
significant equity stake, even if less than five percent, must be promptly
disclosed.64 This was the case with the Abu Dhabi SWF investment in
Citigroup. However, there is no general disclosure requirement for shareholders
that hold less than five percent of a company's equity. As a result, the equity
holdings of most hedge funds, for example, are no more transparent than those
of SWFs. Disclosure regulations in the European Union and major Asian
countries are roughly similar. To explain the controversy, SWFs must pose
different problems than other nontransparent shareholders. The prompt public
disclosure of the terms of the Abu Dhabi SWF's investment in Citigroup did
not temper the Wall Street65Journal'seditorial concern over what the newspaper

styled as "Citi of Arabia."
The economic logic of public corporations highlights a problem that does
distinguish SWFs from other nontransparent shareholders. In a widely held
public corporation, shareholders' wealth is not affected by the corporation's
performance other than through the value of the corporation's shares, a
condition that results from shareholders holding diversified portfolios in an
efficient capital market. In that circumstance, all shareholders will agree that
the company should maximize the value of its shares (although they may still
differ over how this is best accomplished)-what economists call the
"unanimity principle." However, this shared commitment to profit
maximization will not hold if a shareholder can gain from the corporation's
activities in ways that other shareholders cannot. For example, a shareholder
who owns a tavern across the street from one of the corporation's factories will
have a different view about closing that plant than other shareholders; the
tavern owner may oppose the plant closing even if closing the plant is best for
the corporation. In this vein, an SWF may have a strategic motive in addition
to, or instead of, an investment motive. The SWF may wish to help domestic

63.

Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §13(d), (f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f) (2000)

(reports upon acquiring 5% ownership and reports by institutional investors); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), (d), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), (d) (2000) (reports in connection

with proxy solicitations and tender offers).
64. See Exchange Act Rule 13a-l 1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-ll (2008); Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, Form 8-K, General Instructions, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/
form8-k.pdf.
65. Editorial, Citi ofArabia, WALL ST. J.,Nov. 29, 2007, at A18.
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companies secure technology or other expertise from a portfolio company even
if that transfer reduces the portfolio company's value-the loss to the portfolio
company is shared by all owners, while the benefit from the transfer accrues
entirely to the SWF and its government. A fair reading of the current SWF
debate strongly suggests that the principal concern with SWF equity
investments is that they may have a significant strategic element driven by selfinterest. The fear is that SWFs will use their influence on portfolio companies
to secure technology (a concern raised explicitly in the discussion of the Abu
Dhabi fund's investment in AMD), gain access to natural resources, or improve
competitive positions for domestic companies, potentially in a fashion that has
national security concerns for the portfolio company's country of
incorporation. 6 6 To be sure, no one can point to a reported incidence of such
behavior. However, the debate takes the potential (and the logic) for such
behavior extremely seriously.
III. A MINIMALIST

SOLUTION: VOTE SUSPENSION

If the problem with SWF investments is that some funds have strategic,
rather than investment motives, or have the potential to support strategic
behavior should circumstances change in the future (in effect, strategic option
value), then the appropriate response is quite straightforward, at least at the
conceptual level: constrain strategic investments, but leave traditional
investments unaffected. With respect to traditional investments, SWFs'
interests and contributions are identical to those of other shareholders, and they
also provide the range of important macroeconomic benefits we canvassed
earlier. Thus, the line to walk is clear. The question is whether it is feasible.
Actually designing such minimalist regulation is greatly complicated by
the fact that an SWF's investment motives are not transparent regardless of the
extent of an SWF's formal disclosure-its public statements, reports, or filings.
Suppose that pursuant to a new regulatory requirement of an NGO-promulgated
code of best practices, an SWF states that it operates entirely independently of
its government owner. Why would anyone believe the statement? Even if true
in the past, it will be true in the future only if the government so chooses-the
strategic optionality point. Could anyone genuinely believe that the investment
managers of China Investment Corporation or Singapore's Temasek would
hang up the phone if a senior government (or in China's case, Party) official
called to offer advice on the fund's handling of a particular investment to
advance the country's, rather than the portfolio company's, interests? 67 Again,
66. The European Commission's recent recommendation to the European Parliament
and the U.S.-Singapore-Abu Dhabi principles provide a representative list of concerns. See
supra notes 34 and 41 and accompanying text.
67. We do not mean to single out specific foreign governments or foreign governments
in general as having great influence vis-A-vis economic actors. All governments have such
influence. Recall that only one U.S. telecommunications company refused to comply with a
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transparency, whether mandated or encouraged through codes of best
practices-the ubiquitous current policy response to concerns about SWFsdoes not address the real problem. 6 8 Additional disclosure simply cannot
distinguish between strategic and non-strategic investors.
Finally, a disclosure response runs the risk of putting off the government
owners of SWFs, and potentially shifting investments away from developed
countries, even though the approach is likely ineffectual. The governance
principles the United States, the EU, and the IMF seek to impose on SWFs go
directly to a government's power to manage its own assets and entities. Calling
the proposed codes voluntary is somewhat misleading. The European comply
or disclose approach, from which the SWF disclosure approach is derived,
assumes that the market will enforce the voluntary standards if a company does
not comply. But when the noncomplying party is an SWF, the only feasible
enforcement agent is the portfolio company's government. Thus, either the
proposed codes are entirely unenforceable, or they result in a direct intrusion on
the sovereignty of the SWF's government owner.
This leads us to a response that focuses on corporate governance. The
corporate governance system represents the complex of mechanisms by which
a corporation makes decisions. They include management practices and
organizational routines, as well as the formal procedures specified in state
corporation statutes and elaborated in judicial decisions by the courts in the
corporation's state of incorporation. Thus, the corporate governance system
also represents the structure through which an SWF investor must channel its
efforts to influence the corporation in its portfolio to act in the SWF's interests,
as opposed to those of the corporation.
In important circumstances, the formal elements of corporate governance
have great importance. Even the informal, nonlegal elements can operate in the
shadow of the formal, legally dictated decision structures. Suppose a
corporation's senior executives resist efforts by a significant SWF shareholder
to influence the corporation's decisions in a fashion favorable to the SWF, for
example, by declining to authorize technology transfer arrangements with
corporations in the SWF's jurisdiction. In that event, the SWF shareholder can
seek to have the board of directors replace the recalcitrant managers. If that

request by the National Security Agency to turn over phone call records of their customers in
the interests of national security-a request with a questionable legal foundation and
concerning which Congress was unsuccessfully asked to provide retroactive immunity. The
three largest telecommunications companies turned over the call histories of their customers
without objection. See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone
Calls, U.S.A. TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A.
68. For example, a senior U.S. Treasury official lists five policy principles that should
be followed by SWFs. Among these, the first is that SWFs should invest commercially, not
politically. The second is that SWFs should be transparent about their investment policies as
a means of conveying world-class investor integrity. Kimmitt, supra note 4. While these are
completely laudable goals, a commitment by an SWF to abide by these principles is not
credible because there is no mechanism that bonds the SWF to its promise.

1364

STANFORD LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 60:1345

fails, the SWF can seek to persuade other shareholders to join with it and
replace the board. Thus, an SWF's informal influence depends, ultimately, on
its formal influence-its ability to vote its shares.
If an SWF shareholder's influence depends on its ability to vote its shares,
then the obvious means to prevent strategic behavior-behavior that benefits
the SWF or its sovereign owner in ways that do not proportionately benefit
other shareholders-is to restrict an SWF's right to vote. Shares of U.S.
companies acquired by an SWF would lose their voting rights (or automatically
69
be voted in the same proportion as the votes of non-SWF shareholders).
Of course, the expected objection to eliminating the voting rights of SWFheld shares is that it will reduce the shares' value-non-voting shares are worth
less than voting shares. It is this observation that fuels the ultimately mistaken
view that our proposal is protectionist because it reduces the value of foreign
SWF shares. The problem is exacerbated because an SWF's motives for
investing cannot be accurately observed; without more, the proposal does not
successfully walk the line between strategic and non-strategic investors.
Because a statement by the SWF that it operates independently of its
government owner or that it has only non-strategic investment motives is not
credible, the loss of voting rights must apply to all SWFs, even if most SWFs in
fact have solely traditional investment motives (or the value of the strategic
option to the particular SWF-say Norway-is small). The result, the argument
runs, will be to discourage all SWFs from investing, not just those with the
feared strategic motives; all SWFs will have to pay the higher price of voting
shares, but will receive only lower-value, non-voting shares. One would expect
that the important beneficial aspects of SWF capital recycling then would be
compromised. This is hardly regulatory minimalism, and our proposal would
not be a workable solution if it ended there.
This problem of overinclusion can be solved if the voting rights of SWFheld shares are only suspended. The second half of our proposal is that the
shares regain their voting rights when they are sold by the SWF to a nongovernmentally affiliated third party. Under our proposal, an SWF buys voting
shares and sells voting shares. Therefore, it would not affect the SWF's ability
to sell voting stock into the market, tender voting shares in a tender offer, or
sell a block of voting stock to a willing purchaser. 70 The loss of voting rights

69. Note the rough inverse parallelism with the "break through rule" of the EU
Takeover Directive. Under the Directive, shareholder-voting restrictions provided by
corporate charter or contract do not apply where the offeror has gained 75% of the shares of
the target. That is, under certain conditions, non-voting shares become voting shares.
Council Directive 2004/25, art. 11, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12.

70. Thus, the influence of SWF holdings in control transactions and the market for
corporate control would not be compromised. SWF shares would become voting if
purchased by, for example, a hostile bidder for a portfolio company. Our vote suspension
regime would not apply if the SWF acquired sufficient shares to achieve control (again, a
reverse break-through rule). That acquisition would be subject to CFIUS review, thereby
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while the SWF holds the shares-that is, the SWF's loss of the ability to use
the formal and informal mechanisms of corporate governance to serve strategic
ends-serves only to separate those SWFs with strategic motives, whose
investment should be discouraged, from SWFs with purely investment motives,
whose investment should be encouraged. Most important from the perspective
of regulatory minimalism, eliminating the voting rights of SWF-held shares
does not require an administrative determination of an SWF's investment
motives, which would carry with it the obvious discomfort of requiring
sovereign governments to defend their capital market transactions in a
proceeding conducted by another government. Rather, voting suspension
results in self-enforcement by the SWFs themselves because the rule generates
a separating equilibrium: those SWFs for whom strategic value is important
simply will not invest, while those SWFs which, like other shareholders, are
interested only in investment value, will not be deterred. 7 1 And unlike the
proposed codes of best practices, vote suspension does not presume to impose
restrictions on how a sovereign government manages its assets or entities.
IV. THE LIMITS OF VOTE SUSPENSION

Suspending the voting rights of SWF-held shares, while reflecting a
minimalist approach to regulation, is not entirely successful in eliminating
regulatory clutter; it is nonetheless both under and over inclusive. The
underinclusion is the more important, although its effects are less politically
charged than the effects of overinclusion. On balance, neither underinclusion
nor overinclusion presents a significant counterweight to the self-enforcing
character of vote suspension.
A. The Problem of Underinclusion
The most significant way in which suspending the voting rights of SWFheld shares is under inclusive results from the simple fact that using the formal
corporate governance system to influence a portfolio company's
decisionmaking, whether directly or indirectly, is not the only way an SWF can
seek to secure a strategic advantage from a portfolio firm. In addition, an SWF
is not the only vehicle through which a government can act strategically to
influence a foreign corporation's decisions.

eliminating the need for vote suspension since the approval process addresses strategic
concerns directly.
7 1. More precisely, the vote suspension rule operates as a kind of forcing contract that
results in a separating equilibrium--one in which SWFs with non-strategic motives continue
to invest and those with strategic motives do not-without further government action. The
success of the effort depends on the strategically motivated investors having alternative
investments-like controlling acquisitions-that are more attractive to them because of their
strategic value, but which will not be more attractive to non-strategic investors.
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Even if the voting rights of SWF-held shares are suspended, the SWF still
may be able to influence strategically the portfolio company's decisions to the
extent that the portfolio company hopes for future capital infusions from the
SWF; simple reciprocity can operate without the SWF having to invoke the
portfolio company's formal governance structure because the future also casts a
shadow. So long as the portfolio company knows what the SWF wants, the
portfolio company's desire for future equity capital on favorable terms may
allow the SWF to influence the portfolio company's behavior despite its lack of
voting rights.
While this concern cannot be dismissed entirely, constraints exist that
cabin this kind of strategic tit-for-tat. Most important, the generally applicable
disclosure requirements governing public corporations in developed economies
will provide a level of transparency that constrains the portfolio company's
freedom to secure future capital by advancing the SWF's strategic interests. In
most developed economies, the new issuance of shares of a magnitude large
enough to support reciprocity will trigger disclosure of the issuance by the
portfolio company. Such disclosure of the SWF's interests alerts other large
shareholders, as well as the domestic government, to the risk of strategic
influence.
It is also likely that existing generally applicable corporate disclosure rules
will mandate portfolio company disclosure of commercial transactions of a size
large enough to advance significantly the interests of the SWF's government.
For example, in the United States a material transaction between the portfolio
company and a government-controlled company likely would require explicit
disclosure by the portfolio company as part of its continuous disclosure
obligation under U.S. securities laws. That disclosure, in turn, could also lead
to state cororate
law enforcement of rules governing self-interested
72
transactions.

To be sure, one could imagine an SWF initiating a reciprocal exchange not
by buying new shares, but by buying shares in the secondary market with the
goal of artificially supporting the portfolio company's stock price and,
therefore, reducing its cost of new capital from others. But this pattern presents
a disclosure problem as well. Issuing new capital to the public at the SWFsupported price will require that the portfolio company disclose the expected
reciprocity (if the company does not know the strategy, reciprocity is
impossible), which will operate to dissipate the effect of the price support. A
failure to disclose the expected reciprocity will subject portfolio-company
managers to enforcement actions. While the suspended vote is conceptually
under inclusive, in operation the extent of the problem is likely small.
Perhaps more important than reciprocity between an SWF and a portfolio
company, a foreign government can act strategically with respect to a particular
72. See,

e.g.,

PRINCIPLES

RECOMMENDATIONS pt. V (1992).

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND
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company through entities other than an SWF. In countries with large SWFs,
governments typically own significant stakes in operating companies. China
and Singapore are familiar examples. A government-controlled operating
company may have the power to secure strategic concessions from a foreign
company as a precondition to the government company's commercial
purchases from the foreign company or as the price of market entry through a
joint venture. Suspending the voting rights of SWF-held stock affects none of
these techniques because these are not SWF-related relationships. They result
not from the government's role as investor, as with an SWF, but from the
government's role in state capitalism. The difficulties caused by the plate
tectonics between capitalist systems in which the government plays radically
different roles are far more important and far more complicated that those
associated with SWFs. Suspended voting addresses only the latter.
The last of the areas of underinclusion, and we think the least important, is
an SWF's ability to acquire voting rights independently of its actual share
ownership, through what has come to be called "empty voting"-the
acquisition of voting rights without the associated equity ownership (the
reciprocal of suspending the voting rights of SWF-held stock). This is
accomplished by the SWF (or any other government controlled entity) securing
voting rights without an equity investment through borrowing shares, hedged
investments, or custom derivatives. 73 In the limited circumstances where these
techniques have been observed, the company typically is not willing to
cooperate with the party seeking to influence the company's behavior. 74 The
debate over SWFs, in contrast, is largely over cooperative arrangements, where
the SWF's investment is desired by the company. In a non-cooperative
circumstance, efforts to avoid the voting suspension can be detected by the
portfolio company and can be challenged under state corporate law. While
theoretically possible, we do not view empty voting techniques as being a
significant factor in the SWF debate.
B. The Problem of Overinclusion

Suspending the voting rights of SWF-held equity is also over inclusive
because it will impact entities other than foreign SWFs. To this point, our
discussion has treated equity investments by SWFs and government pension
funds as creating equivalent risks of strategic behavior. For the purpose of
assessing overinclusion, the role of government pension funds takes on special
73. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 811 (2006); Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard
Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling I." Importance and Extensions (U. Tex. Sch. of Law,
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 122) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1030721.
74. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governanceand Control, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1075-77 (2007).
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prominence. From the perspective of the United States, the overinclusion
problem results from the expectation that governments whose SWFs and
pension funds have their voting rights suspended will impose similar
suspensions on the equity holdings of comparable U.S. government entities.
Unless the U.S. Social Security System is reorganized to allow it to make
equity investments, as the Bush administration unsuccessfully proposed, the
impact of this reaction will fall almost exclusively on state pension funds, like
CalPERS, and the few U.S. state-level SWFs, like the Alaska Permanent
Revenue Fund, all of which hold increasing amounts of foreign equities for the
same reason that investment-oriented foreign SWFs have shifted to equity
investments-to increase their returns and diversification.
On first consideration, suspending the voting rights of U.S. state pension
fund foreign-equity investments should not hurt the funds' performance for the
same reason that vote suspension should not deter U.S. equity investments by
foreign SWFs who do not have a strategic motive. As long as the U.S. state
pension funds are treated in reciprocal fashion-that is, suspended voting rights
are restored when the shares are sold-the holding-period suspension does not
reduce the shares' investment value. On further consideration, however,
something is lost: the positive impact that shareholder activism by U.S. state
pension funds, most vocally by CalPERS, has had on corporate governance
standards in other countries. 75 This effort, which is not strategic because all
shareholders benefit equally from it, does require voting rights. Its loss will be
felt not only by the U.S. funds with respect to their existing investmentsfuture investments will be at prices that reflect the loss of pressure for good
governance-but also by other companies selling equity in those markets,
where a reduction in the pressure for more effective corporate governance can
be expected to increase the cost of capital. An optimistic view is that the cost
will be relatively small. The successful movement toward higher corporate
governance standards across the developed world makes the role U.S. state
pension funds have played less central to the effort to improve corporate
governance standards. To be sure, this is a cost, but we think not a large one.
CONCLUSION

The high profile controversy over SWFs' shift to equity investments is
only one of the frictions that result from the interaction of two very different
conceptions of the role of government in a capitalist economy. But because this
form of portfolio investment in private firms by government-controlled funds,
unlike investments of controlling stakes by SOEs, currently falls outside

75. See CAL. PuB. EMPLOYEES' RET. Sys., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE

CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
13
(2007),
available
at
http://www.calpersgovemance.org/principles/international/global/downloads/global-corpgov-principles.pdf
(describing policies for developing nations and other countries).
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national regulatory regimes, it has raised considerable concern over a potential
loss of sovereignty and distortion of markets. Not surprisingly then, SWFs have
sparked a wave of protectionist sentiment in the more market-oriented polities.
Suspension of the voting rights of SWFs addresses one facet of the
competition between market and new-mercantilist capitalism. It solves the
immediate problem at which it is addressed-the use of a portfolio company's
corporate governance structure to influence its decisions in a fashion that works
to the advantage of the SWF's government owner at the expense of the
portfolio company's other shareholders and potentially the host country itself.
This solution cannot solve the larger problems that arise from the interaction of
different concepts of capitalism, but it can address the most serous risk SWFs
pose: that the perception of strategic behavior by foreign state-owned entities
will result in a protectionist backlash. If vote suspension reduces the risk of a
protectionist response, it will allow the global markets to demonstrate that, in
the long run, governments make ineffective capitalists, especially where
innovation is the ultimate currency. Buying time to allow the competition
between the two systems of capitalism to work itself out is no small matter.
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